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ABSTRACT 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has acted as New Zealand's final appellate court 
ever since the English colonised our country. With increasing frequency, cases that have been 
ruled upon by the New Zealand Court of Appeal are taken to the Lawlords for final resolution 
of the dispute. 
For almost as long as the Privy Council has participated in our justice system, critics have 
bemoa.ned its New Zealand jurisdiction. By focusing on such matters as the cost of bringing 
an appeal to the Council, the inevitable delay involved, and the threat posed to New Zealand's 
autonomy and "indigenous" legal identity, these critics have argued that the right of appeal 
should be abolished. 
In contrast, there have always been those who applaud the actual and symtolic contribution 
made by the Privy Council. These supporters tend to focus on the efficiency of the process, 
on the fact that the Privy Council is not pa.id for by the New Zealand public, and on the high 
standard of legal reasoning evident in Privy Council appeals. A further, and increc:1.~ingly 
significant, claim in favour of the Privy Council is that it acts as a saf,~guard in those rare 
cases where the Court of Appeal, for whatever reason, delivers a questionable judgment. 
The issue of retention or abolition of appeals to the Privy Council involves weighing up the 
relative merits or otherwise of the right of appeal. In this paper I have attempted to outline 
the issues relevant to the Privy Council debate. Although proponents of the abolition camp 
do have many valid concerns, these concerns are ultimately outweighed by the vital need for 
a final appellate court that can look into Court of Appeal decisions which patently require re-
examination. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 16 300 words. 
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1 
I INTRODUCTION 
When crossing India's Rajputana plateau, a nineteenth century traveller noticed a group 
of villagers offering sacrifice to a far-off god. who had restored to them certain lands 
which had been seized by a predatory rajah. Inquiries about the deity they were 
worshipping drew the response: "We know nothing of him but that he is a good god, 
and that his name is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." 1 
New Zealand's final appellate court is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Every 
year, and with increasingly frequency, decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal are 
taken to England to be decided by members of the English judiciary and visiting judges from 
member jurisdictions. 
Ever since the Privy Council assumed the role of final New Zealand appellate court, debate 
has ensued on the merits or otherwise of foreign judges determining local cases. On the 
"abolition" front, a number of arguments stand out. Criticism is made of the enormous cost 
of Privy Council appeals, which effectively prohibits all but the very wealthy from taking this 
course. Another way in which the Privy Council is thought to prejudice against certain 
groups of the community is that criminal cases are very seldom granted leave to appeal, 
which effectively limits the Privy Council to a civil jurisdiction, and denies criminal cases this 
final appeal option. Privy Council appeals also delay the administration of justice, and so few 
cases are taken on appeal that the significance of the right of appeal is questionable. Perhaps 
the most popular voice amongst abolitionists is that the Privy Council undermines the 
autonomy and identity of New Zealand. Commentators have suggested that the right of 
appeal to the Privy Council challenges the independence of our judiciary, and New Zealand's 
independence from its motherland. Privy Council appeals may also fail to consider 
"indigenous" aspects of New Zealand's legal and social make-up, and are inappropriate if 
issues such as the Treaty of Waitangi and Bill of Rights Act 1990 are being determined. All 
of these arguments will be examined in greater detail later in this paper. 
P A Howell The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1833 - 1876 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1979). 
2 
The arguments raised by those in favour of retaining the right of appeal to the Privy Council 
are perhaps not as well publicised or known. In their favour, however, they have quietly and 
confidently fought off over a century of anti-Privy Council sentiment. Commentators who 
support the final appeal to the Privy Council mention the efficiency of the process involved, 
and the fact that it is paid for by the English public. They also talk of the opportunity it 
provides for witnessing the best of English lawyers at work. Finally, and of particular 
importance to this paper, those in favour of Privy Council appeals stress the need for a final 
appeal court that can re-examine and, if need be, re-assess Court of Appeal judgments that 
are inconsistent or just plain wrong. Given that the Privy Council in recent years has 
overturned Court of Appeal judgments at a greater rate than ever before, this argument is 
assuming heightened significance. Six recent Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgments 
have been examined in this paper, concerning equity and the law of torts, in an attempt to 
ascertain the legitimacy of these claims. 
If, as politicians are currently pronouncing, the Privy Council may soon cease to be New 
Zealand's final appellate court, the question arises of what will take its place. Over the years 
a number of alternatives have been canvassed, and these will be briefly outlined. What must 
be kept in mind, however, is that no one alternative has yet been established as a particularly 
suitable alternative, and this in spite of the fact that many would concede an alternative final 
appeal court is necessary before New Zealand does away with appeals to the Privy Council. 
Furthermore, politicians have been pronouncing for decades the right of appeal to the Privy 
Council is on its way out. Until affirmative steps are taken in this direction, these statements 
must simply be added to the history of rhetoric surrounding the Privy Council debate. 
A History of the Privy Council 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council derives its jurisdiction from the prerogative right 
of the Sovereign, as the fountain head of all justice, to entertain appeals from the courts 
within her dominions.2 Its constitution initially bestowed office upon a number of high-
ranking British judiciary, among them the Lord President, Lord Chancellor, and other 
2 Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed. Butterworths, London, 1975) vol 10, "Courts", para 770, p 356. 
3 
members who had or still did hold high judicial office.3 Membership was eventually 
extended to include Privy Councillors who had been or still were chief justices or justices of 
other countries.4 New Zealand is among the countries represented on the Privy Council 
judiciary, with an agreed member from New Zealand sitting approximately once every two 
years. 5 
During the early prosperous years of the British Empire, the Privy Council was the final court 
of appeal for one-fourth of the world,6 and it was believed by some that it would become the 
Supreme Court of the whole Empire.7 This vision never realised, however, and with the 
enactment of the Statute of Westminster in 1941 Dominions were empowered to override 
Imperial Law, and thereby discontinue appeals to the Privy Council. Most of the larger and 
more powerful Commonwealth members have long ceased taking appeals to the Privy Council 
- Canada relinquished its right of appeal in 1949,8 Australia relinquished federal appeals in 
19679 and State appeals in 1986, 10 and Singapore gave up its right of appeal to the Privy 
Council in 1993. New Zealand is now the only significant country of the old Commonwealth 
that has retained appeals to the Council. 11 
B How Appeals get to the Privy Council 
The procedural rules that govern appeals to the Privy Council are of English not New Zealand 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Above n 2, para 767, p 357. 
Above n 2. para 768, p 357. 
Sir G Barwick New Zealand Commentary on Halsbury' s Laws of England (4 ed. Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1981) Vol C, "Courts", para C768, p 732. Eichelbaum CJ was the most recent New 
Zealand judge to sit as a member of the Privy Council in late I 993. 
JG Hall and D F Martin "The Future of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" (1993) 143 New 
LJ 1652. 
In 1921 Lord Haldane expressed his vision of the Privy Council becoming the Supreme Court of the 
Empire, see above n 6. 
L Zines Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991) 
83. 
"Cut-Price Top Legal Advice" National Business Review Weekend Supplement, Wellington. New 
Zealand, 24 November 1989. w3 . 
Above n 8, 22. 
J McLinden "The Privy Council in the 1990s" (1992) 364 LawTalk 10 - countries that still use the 
court, other than New Zealand, are Hong Kong, Brunei, Gambia, Mauritius, Gibraltar and a number of 
the West Indies of which Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica. 
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origin, and require an appellant to initiate appeal procedures within New Zealand pursuant to 
the 1910 Order, and complete the appeal in England pursuant to the 1982 Rules. 
12 Rule 2 
of the 1910 Order is the fundamental procedural provision. It provides three situations in 
which a right of appeal shall lie to the Privy Council from New Zealand. 
Rule 2(a) provides that an appeal shall lie as of right, from any final judgement of the Court 
of Appeal where the value in dispute is NZ$5000 or more. This is a straightforward 
provision, and it is probable that few disputes would reach the Court of Appeal today 
involving less than that sum. 
13 It has been suggested that this sum is in fact too generous 
a provision for appeal as of right 
14 
Rule 2(c) provides for appeal to lie at the discretion of the High Court. This is an exceptional 
provision, that would now appear to be basically obsolete. 
15 Although it has been praised 
for allowing quicker and cheaper access to the Privy Council, 
16 it has been admonished for 
the fact that the Law Lords of the Privy Council are deprived of the benefit of the Court of 
Appeal's judgement.17 Cooke J (as he was then) expressed reservations of Rule 2(c) m 
Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc (No 3).
18 
Rule 2(b) is the most significant provision governing rights of appeal to the Privy Council. 
It provides that an appeal shall lie at the Court of Appeal's discretion if the question is of 
great general or public importance, or otherwise ought to be submitted for decision. Judicial 
interpretation of Rule 2(b) has seen a number of provisos attached to this provision. Firstly, 
mere private importance will not suffice,
19 and it is insufficient to show that an important 
question of law is involved. Instead, the question must be of great general or public 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
McGechan on Procedure (Brookers, Wellington, 1985 - 1988) Vo! 1, p 4A-l - the "1910 Order" is the 
Order in Council provided for appeals from the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal in New Zealand 
of 10 January 1910, as printed in PC (JC) Rules Notice 1973 (SR 1973/181) . and the" 1982 Rules" are 
the Judicial Committee (General Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules Order 1982 (UK) Sl 1982 No 1676. 
J W Turner "Civil Procedure" (1992) 1 NZ Recent Law 15, 25. 
Above n 13, 28. 
Above n 13, 25. 
A P Molloy '" Leap-Frogging' to the Privy Council" [1980) NZLJ 455. 456. 
Above n 16, 457. 
(1985) 2 NZLR 190, 193 per Cooke J - admittedly in a slightly different context. 
Stininato v Auckland Boxing Association (No 2) (1978) 1 NZLR 609, 611. 
5 
importance.20 This is a relatively unpredictable test,21 as is apparent when the judgment 
of Bhasin v Elite Lifestyles Ltd22 is compared with Attorney General for Hong Kong v 
Reid.23 In the former case it was decided that the question arising between mortgagee and 
mortgagor was not of general public importance, whereas in the latter case it was decided that 
the continued application of old English authority was an important question for appropriate 
consideration. Secondly, the proviso "or otherwise ought to be submitted for decision", 
although allowing the Court of Appeal to consider reasons other than great general or public 
importance, still requires something beyond the normal run of cases.24 Thirdly, even if the 
applicant satisfies the Court that Rule 2(b)'s requirements have been complied with, the Court 
retains an overriding discretion to withhold leave. Discretionary refusal, although unlikely, 
is not unknown. 25 
C Incidence of Privy Council Appeals from New Zealand 
Very rarely are cases appealed from New Zealand to the Privy Council, and those that are 
appealed tend to be almost exclusively civil. Over the past 150 years the Privy Council has 
decided approximately 200 New Zealand appeals, one third of which were decided in the 
appellant's favour. Although during this time there has been a modest increase in the 
incidence of appeals,26 it is salient to note that in the last six years applications for leave to 
appeal have actually tripled. 27 
The most significant, and controversial, feature of recent appeals to the Privy Council is that 
the Privy Council is increasingly overturning judgments of the Court of Appeal. Although 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Rich v Christchurch Girls' High School Board of Governors (No 2) (1974) l NZLR 21, 23 (CA). 
Above n 12, 4A-l l. 
(1991) l NZLR 95; (1990) 3 PRNZ 102 (CA). 
(1992) 2 NZLR 394. 
Hallam v Ryan (1991) l NZLR 700; (1990) 3 PRNZ 562 (CA). 
For instance, see above n 18 - common ground for refusal to grant leave under Rule 2(b) was that the 
appeal had become academic. 
P Joseph "Towards Abolition of Privy Council Appeals: The Judicial Committee and the Bill of Rights" 
(1985) 2(3) Canterbury LR 273, 275 - from 1840 to 1932 an average of 1.1 appeals went to the Privy 
Council per year, 1.3 from 1958 to 1973, and 1.9 from 1975 to 1984. 
"Auditors, Forex Advisers, Privy Council on Trial" Independent Auck.land, New Zea.land, 26 March 
1993, 10. 
6 
this is predominantly in the area of negligence,28 it reflects a broader trend than negligence 
alone, and is seen by some as heightening the need for an examination of the role the Privy 
Council has to play in the legal system of New Zealand.29
 Even though the Privy Council's 
increased tendency to overturn the Court of Appeal is relatively recent, debate on the retention 
or abolition of the Privy Council is by no stretch of the imagination a novel phenomenon. 
D To be or not to be ... Within the Jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a judicial uproar erupted in the colony of New 
Zealand, upon receipt of the Privy Council's judgment Wallis and others v Solicitor 
General. 30 The New Zealand Supreme Court judges took great offence at what they 
perceived to be the derogatory insinuations of the Privy Council judiciary, aimed at the New 
Zealand Supreme Court. Action was taken in the form of a "Protest of Bench and Bar",3' 
in which the judiciary raised many of the arguments that are stili currently used today. Sir 
Robert Stout CJ reproached the Privy Council for not being conversant with our history, and 
for being ignorant of our local laws.32 Mr Justice Williams declared that the Privy Council 
was an "alien tribunal",33 pointing out that the Privy Council decision weakened the New 
Zealand Supreme Court ' s authority.34 He stated that it was the responsibility of the New 
Zealand public to judge the Supreme Court, not "four strangers sitting 14,000 miles away".
35 
Today, these same issues are bantered back and forth when the retention or abolition of the 
Privy Council is being discussed. The most prominent and influential of these arguments is 
that the Privy Council undermines or threatens to undermine New Zealand ' s autonomy and 
identity. Other arguments raised are the cost, delay and incidence of appeals, and the fact that 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
"Questions on Role of Privy Council" Otago Daily Times Dunedin, New Zealand, 10 August 1993. 21. 
For a discussion of recent New Zealand appeals to the Privy Council concerning negligence and duties 
of care, see pp 26 - 32. 
[1840 - 1932) NZPCC 23. 
"Protest of Bench and Bar, April 25 1903" [1840 - 1932) NZPCC 730. 
Above n 30, 737 and 745. 
Above n 30, 756. 
Above n 30, 747. 
Above n 30, 756. 
7 
Privy Council appeals are in practice unavailable for criminal appeals. 
II ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF ABOLITION 
A Cost 
The substantial cost of applying and taking an appeal to the Privy Council from New Zealand 
is widely seen as a reason for abrogating Privy Council appeals. In effect, the cost prohibits 
all but the Crown, substantial corporations and wealthy individual litigants from utilizing this 
final appellate court.36 A further financial obstacle to appeals to the Privy Council is that 
legal aid is unavailable for criminal appeals. 37 The prohibitive cost involved in an appeal 
to the Privy Council was raised by the Royal Commission on the Courts in 1978.38 
However, the Royal Commission also pointed out in this report that, while the cost is high, 
it only exceeds the cost of a Court of Appeal appeal in terms of airfare and accommodation. 
The Conunission suggested that these additional costs are justified by the value of the appeal 
itself. 39 
B Delay 
It was pointed out in the New Zealand Law Commission's 1989 report The Structure of the 
Courts that "a principle of our legal system dating back to Magna Carta is that justice must 
not be deferred".40 This statement was referring to appeals to the Privy Council, which 
inevitably delay the administration of justice. Some people see the Privy Council option as 
a delay tactic, which effectively mandates an abuse of the courts ' process.41 Problems with 
delay may be heightened by an anomaly within the Privy Council rules, which allows only 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Above n 26, 277. 
C Cato "Privy Council: The Takaro Properties Case" [1988] NZU 110. 114. 
Royal Commission on the Courts (Government Printer, Wellington. 1978), para 279, p 82. 
Above n 38, para 272, p 80. 
New Zealand Law Commission The Structure of the Courts (Wellington, 1989) para 236, p 82. 
Above n 27, 10. 
8 
21 days within which to seek conditional leave to appeal from a judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, as compared to a three month period for appeals from the High Court to Court of 
Appeal. This raises the concern that in cases involving intricate or complex matters, 
prospective appellants may feel obliged to lodge an appeal to allow themselves enough time 
to consider the Court of Appeal's judgment.42 
The issue of delay also raises an established principle of law, found in the judgment of Casey 
J in Green,43 that "the public interest requires that there be an end to litigation". 
C Criminal Appeals 
Criminal appeals can be made to the Privy Council, subject to compliance with Rules 2(b) 
or (c) of the 1910 Order. However, the Privy Council is traditionally reluctant to 
intervene.44 This is ironic when it is considered that criminal appeals are probably the most 
suitable contenders for a further right of appeal, as they are most likely to involve questions 
of the liberty of the individual in relation to the State. The Court of Appeal is therefore in 
practice the final criminal appellate court.45 Sir David Beattie, former Governor General and 
Supreme Court judge of New Zealand, recently pointed out the manifest unjustness of this 
situation, saying that "[I]f there is only the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal where the 
liberty of a subject is at stake it is difficult to contend there should be two appeals in a civil 
case".46 
D Incidence of Appeals 
Traditionally, there have been so few appeals taken to the Privy Council that it has been 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Above n 13, 28. 
[1988) 2 NZLR 490, 505. 
The only successful criminal appeal to the Privy Council from New Zealand is R v Nakhla (1975) l 
NZLR 393. In 1994 the case of Adams v R was appealed to the Privy Council. Although the appeal 
was unsuccessful, the Privy Council "took issue" with the Court of Appeal's approach - see Adams v 
R (1994) 17 TCL 43/6. 
Above n 37, para 274, p 81. 
"Privy Council Appeal 'Colonial Relic"' Evening Post Wellington. New Zealand, 5 October 1993. 7. 
9 
realistic to consider the Court of Appeal as our final appellate court. It is only in recent years 
that appeals from New Zealand to the Privy Council have increased, despite more efficient 
air travel and an increasingly litigious society.47 The low incidence of Privy Council appeals 
prior to the late 1980s, however, need not be viewed as unique to the Privy Council system. 
The proportion of second appeals in any jurisdiction is miniscule.48 It is also important to 
note that second appeals are not provided for the benefit of individual litigants, but to 
elucidate and clarify the law.49 Surely there are few cases in which this is required. 
E Autonomy and Identity 
The most significant voice in the abolition/retention debate is that of New Zealanders 
proclaiming the autonomy of their country and their identification with New Zealand as it is 
today, rather than as it was during its colonial past This voice gives rise to claims that the 
right of appeal to the Privy Council is a "colonial relic",50 that it is an affront to our national 
sovereignty51 and to our legal system, which has now "come of age".52 President of the 
Court of Appeal, Sir Robin Cooke, expressed similar sentiments at the 1987 Law Conference, 
saying "We must accept responsibility for our own national destiny and recognise that the 
Privy Council has outlived its time. Not to take the obvious decision now would be to 
renounce part of our nationhood. "53 A decade earlier former Court of Appeal president, Sir 
Thaddeus McCarthy, said as much upon retirement.54 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
I believe that just as we decide all other questions for ourselves - whether to go to war, 
whether we trade with this country or that country, what immigrants we should have, 
I see no reason that we should not decide the law ourselves. 
Above n 26, 275. 
Above n 40, para 247, p 85. 
Above n 40, para 238, p 83. 
Above n 46, 7. 
Above n 13, 25. 
A Culley "Case Notes: New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Apple Fields Ltd (1991] 1 
NZLR 257" (1991) 6(4) Auckland Uni LR 618, 621. 
Above n 52, 621. 
Above n 46, 7. 
10 
McCarthy substantiated his views by pointing out "the difficulties of their Lordships in 
understanding the backgrounds to New Zealand cases, our social philosophies, sometimes 
even our language".55 Ideas such as these are rife in the abolition/retention debate, when 
New Zealand's autonomy and identity is at issue. 
Judicial independence 
During New Zealand's early colonial years, appeals to the Privy Council were justified 
because they preserved against judicial corruptibility, partiality and dependence on the 
executive.56 Nearly one hundred years ago the New Zealand Supreme Court judiciary were 
incensed at allegations made against them by the Privy Council that their judgment in Wi 
Parata v Bishop of Wellington57 may have been influenced by the executive. 58 Does this 
notion of judicial dependence still influence the debate today? Some commentators would 
have us think not.59 Certainly it is no longer likely that the Privy Council will expressly 
make this allegation. However, a number of contemporary constitutional law experts have 
advocated the retention of appeals to the Privy Council in order to protect against the pressure 
of making "popular" decisions.60 The Royal Commission paid heed to both sides of this 
argument, recognizing that United Kingdom judges are removed from the local scene and 
pressures,61 while also acknowledging that (1) the inference that New Zealand judges are 
insufficiently detached is unfair and incorrect, and (2) detachment from local pressures can 
in fact be a disadvantage rather than a merit.62 
2 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Retention of links with Commonwealth 
Above n 26, 279. It is interesting to compare McCarthy's comment that their Lordships are unable to 
understand "our" language with the recent Maori Broadcasting case (below n 82), in which the Privy 
Council may be said to have evinced a greater understanding of the cultural and legal significance of 
the Maori language than the Court of Appeal. 
Lord Normand "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council - Retrospect and Prospect" ( 1950) 3 CLP 
1, 5. 
(1877) 3 NZ Jur 72 (SC). 
Above n 30. 
Above n 37, 114. 
Above n 9, w3. 
Above n 38, para 269, p 80. 
Above n 38, para 276, p 81. 
11 
The argument that by retaining the right of appeal to the Privy Council we retain links with 
the Commonwealth is now obsolete. Joseph suggests that the right of appeal infers our Court 
of Appeal is in need of the continuing beneficence and guidance of their Lordships, which 
is "utterly derogatory of New Zealand's constitutional maturity".63 Joseph continues:64 
[C]onstitutional govenunent historically and factually encompasses all three estates of 
the realm - the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. For this reason it is 
misplaced to propose judicial expertise from abroad as a reason for retaining Privy 
Council appeals. New Zealand does not seek the assistance of the English, the Irish or 
the Scots in other branches of govenunent. Why then in the judiciary? 
In comparison, the Royal Commission mentioned the retention of common links with the 
United Kingdom as a point in favour of the Privy Council.65 
3 "Local circumstances" exception 
Traditionally, appeals to the Privy Council were declined if they impinged upon "local 
circumstances" that their Lordships were not qualified to judge upon. However, the notion 
of "local circumstances" employed by the Privy Council has varied, depending on whether 
a "unitary" or "divergent" view of the common law is taken.66 The divergent view of the 
common law accepts that its norms vary from one jurisdiction to another,67 while the unitary 
view sees the common law "as including fundamental principles which transcend different 
jurisdictions and which ought to be immune from deliberate judicial abrogation".68 
Whichever view of the common law is respectively adhered to by the Privy Council 
ultimately decides the amount of criticism levelled at a decision. In particular, the unitary 
view of the common law is seen to undermine attributes and issues that are unique to a 
particular country. 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
Above n 26, 291. 
Above n 26, 296. 
Above n 38, para 271, p 80. 
J W Harris "The Privy Council and the Common Law" (1990) 106 LQR 574. 580. See also P G 
McHugh "The Appeal of 'Local Circumstances' to the Privy Council" [1987] NZLJ 24. 
Above n 66, 574 - see Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027, 1127 per Lord Diplock. 
Above n 66, 574. 
12 
The Privy Council employed a unitary view of the common law in Hart v O'Connor,
69 
overruling the unanimous decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Archer v Cutler
70 
because it felt that the Court of Appeal's decision was merely based on considerations of 
general application throughout all common law jurisdictions. More recently, in New Zealand 
Apple & Pear Marketing Board v Applefields Ltd
71 the Privy Council submitted that it 
rejected the Court of Appeal's reasoning because the issue was wholly governed by statute, 
and therefore its resolution was purely a matter of interpretation.
72 This approach could be 
criticised in a number of ways. Firstly, what may outwardly appear to be "merely" an issue 
of statutory interpretation may in fact encompass wider social policy concerns. Secondly, a 
unitary approach such as that utilized in Applefields, which regards uniformity as a positive 
goal in itself, harks back to the antiquated notion of Imperial Law.
73 
Only a divergent view of the common law is appropriate today, where the respective countries 
of the Commonwealth that have retained rights of appeal to the Privy Council are diverse and 
dissimilar. That this is in fact the intended approach of the Privy Council was signalled in 
Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid and others,
74 when Lord Templeman in delivering 
the Board's judgment pointed out that the Court of Appeal should no longer feel itself to be 
bound by contemporary English law, in the absence of differentiating local circumstances.
75 
This enlightened and important view on the role of English precedent in New Zealand law 
suggests that the Privy Council no longer adheres to a unitary view of the common law, 
which ousts an argument frequently made by proponents of the abolition camp. 
4 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
New Zealand's "indigenous"76 legal identity 
[1985) AC 1000. 
[1980) 1 NZLR 386. 
[1991) l NZLR 257. 
Above n 52, 620. 
Above n 66, 582 - the notion of Imperial Law "dates back, at least, to Trimble v Hill (1879) 5 App Cas 
342, where it was said to be of importance that in all parts of the empire where English law prevailed 
uniform interpretation of that law was to be sought". 
(1994) l All ER l. 
Above n 74, 11. 
See Budget Rent-A-Car v ARA (1985) 2 NZLR 76, 79 per Cooke J. 
13 
Many opponents of the right of appeal to the Privy Council submit that New Zealand has its 
own unique legal identity, and that only judges who understand and empathise with this legal 
identity should preside over New Zealand cases. They argue that this "indigenous" legal 
identity has departed in certain fundamental ways from the legal culture of our English 
heritage, although some characteristics may be shared between the two.77 
To this extent New Zealand law may be said to be indigenous: not in the sense that it 
is completely different in substance from other jurisdictions, but rather in the sense that 
it is as it is because it is seen by New Zealand's authorities as best for New Zealand. 
It is not indigenous in the sense that the laws of other jurisdictions have not been 
influential in shaping it, but rather in the sense that they have not been decisive. 
One area of law that could prove to be particularly significant in this respect is the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. This issue was anticipated by the government report into 
the Bill of Rights Act, the "White Paper". It proposed that only New Zealand judges should 
be entrusted to decide whether legal limits imposed upon Bill of Rights freedoms are in fact 
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".78 A similar view has been 
expressed by the Court of Appeal.79 The New Zealand Law Commission acknowledged in 
its report written at the time the Bill of Rights Act was being legislated that the Court of 
Appeal is increasingly being faced with a continuing surfacing of policy cases, which must 
be solved in a manner "best fitting the particular national way of life and ethos".80 
5 The Treaty of W aitangi 
At first glance it may seem apparent that the Treaty of Waitangi, being unique to New 
Zealand, should be resolved within our own legal system. Certainly Prime Minister Jim 
Bolger said as much in media statements of early 1994.81 Yet a recent New Zealand case 
77 
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80 
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with in a distant court". 
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taken to the Privy Council, New Zealand Maori Council and others v Attorney Gen
eral,82 
would appear to indicate otherwise. The Privy Council decision upheld the Court o
f Appeal 
judgment, that the Crown was entitled to transfer its broadcasting assets to 
the SOE, 
Television New Zealand. However, the Privy Council made a number of statements
 that gave 
the Maori appellants, and the Maori community, cause not to lose heart.
83 Firstly, the 
Council declined to order that the Maori appellants pay costs, stating that the pro
ceedings 
were brought not out of any motive of personal gain, but in the interests of t
he Maori 
language, which is an important part of New Zealand's heritage.
84 The decision was also 
encouraging because the Council agreed with the High Court and Court of Appea
l that the 
Maori language was a taonga, deserving of the Crown's protection, in accordance w
ith the 
treaty.85 It took this idea a step further than the Court of Appeal, however,
86 by assigning 
legal significance to the government's assurance to the Maori that it would set up 
a scheme 
of protective reservations as to the continued broadcasting of Te Reo Maori progr
amrnes.87 
The Privy Council suggested that the Crown's failure to comply with this assur
ance may 
"give rise to a successful challenge on an application for judicial review".
88 Whatatangi 
Winiata, an appellant in the case, subsequently declared that he was "considerably
 cheered" 
by the Privy Council's declaration that the Treaty of Waitangi is of "the greatest cons
titutional 
importance to New Zealand", and proceeded to reconsider his anti-Privy Council s
tance.89 
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Perhaps the most vocal of arguments in favour of retaining a right of appeal to the Privy 
Council comes from the New Zealand judiciary and legal profession, who revere the Council 
for its honourable tradition and high calibre of practice.90 On his recent return from the 
Privy Council, Chief Justice Eichelbaum commented on how valuable it is for a New Zealand 
judge or lawyer "[t]o be exposed to the variety of styles and the reasoning process of the top 
English legal brains".91 However, access to this style and reasoning would still be possible 
without the right of appeal, therefore this in itself is not a valid reason for retaining Privy 
Council appeals.92 As Sean Baldwin points out, "[j]ust because we would no longer be a 
branch of the common law tree doesn't mean we would be precluded from picking its 
fruit" .93 
Other arguments against abolition are that the Privy Council procedure is a distinctively quick 
and informal procedure,94 the cost of which falls largely on the British taxpayer. 95 The cost 
to New Zealand of replacing the Privy Council as a final court of appeal, if indeed that is 
what would be done, is a persuasive reason for retaining the right of appeal to the Privy 
Council. 
A further reason for retaining our membership of the Privy Council is that it ensures that 
inconsistent or questionable Court of Appeal judgments have a further judicial forum in which 
to debate the correctness or otherwise of the Court of Appeal judgment.96 This is a 
compelling idea, if it is accepted that the New Zealand Court of Appeal requires a further 
forum in which to test particularly intricate or significant legal issues. 
B Analysis of Six Recent Court of Appeal Decisions Taken on Appeal to 
the Privy Council - Equitable and Tortious Issues 
90 
91 
92 
93 
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96 
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1 Determining whether the relationship between the parties is fiduciary in nature 
An apt starting point m any discussion of the relative similarities and differences in the 
judicial reasoning of recent New Zealand Court of Appeal decisions taken on appeal to the 
Privy Council is the matter of fiduciary relationships. The fiduciary obligation, a concept 
developed by equity, does not rely on express or written agreement between the parties, and 
may give rise to a number of remedies if the fiduciary breaches his or her duty.97 It arises 
in situations where, due to the nature of the relationship between the parties, a particular 
standard of conduct is imposed. Gault J in the Court of Appeal decision Liggett v 
Kensington98 described it in the following manner:99 
Generally it is appropriate to look for circumstances in which one person has 
undertaken to act in the interests of another or conversely has communicated an 
expectation that another will act to protect or promote his or her interests. There are 
elements of reliance, confidence or trust between them often arising out of an imbalance 
in strength or vulnerability in relation to the exercise of rights, powers or the use of 
information affecting their interests. 
In the Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgments examined for this paper, the actual 
imposition of a fiduciary relationship by the Court of Appeal was seldom questioned in the 
Privy Council. For instance, in Clark Boyce v Mouat the Privy Council100 agreed with the 
Court of Appeal101 that a fiduciary relationship existed between the 72 year old appellant 
and the solicitor. Similarly, the Privy Council judgment102 in Attorney General of Hong 
Kong v Reid commences with the assumption that the Court of Appeal103 was correct in 
deciding that a fiduciary relationship existed between the Hong Kong government and Mr 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
See Professor Charles Rickett Equity in Commerce (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, March 1993) 
14 - 25 for a summary of the proprietary and in personam remedies available if a fiduciary duty is 
breached. 
(1993) l NZLR 257. 
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Reid, a past employee of the Hong Kong government who had been convicted under the 
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of being in control of pecuniary resources or property 
disproportionate to his present or past official emoluments. 
However, the Goldcorp case Liggett v Kensington is a striking example of the Privy 
Council 104 disagreeing with the majority's conclusion in the Court of Appeal 105 as to the 
nature of the parties' relationship. The case concerned a gold and bullion company, Goldcorp 
Exchange Ltd (Exchange), which became insolvent, leaving a serious shortfall in its stocks 
of gold bullion. Many of the company's clients - including a Mr Liggett who had made a 
particularly large purchase of bullion, and other clients described in the case as "non-allocated 
claimants" - had paid money in the belief that they were purchasing physical bullion which 
Exchange held in safekeeping for them. Exchange had made (false) representations to them 
that the bullion would be held as part of an unallocated bulk, but with adequate stock to meet 
all their obligations to their clients. Clients were given certificates of ownership, and were 
informed of the right to uplift their bullion with seven days notice. On Exchange's collapse, 
however, if became apparent that Exchange had not operated in a manner consistent with its 
representations. Debts to secured creditors exceeded assets. The claimants would therefore 
only succeed if they could establish proprietary interest in the remaining bullion, so as to 
defeat the interests of the secured creditors. Unsecured creditors unable to establish such an 
interest would get nothing. Thus, the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the parties' 
relationship was fiduciary was crucial because it allowed the claimants a proprietary remedy 
capable of defeating the interests of secured creditors. 
In the Court of Appeal, the minority judgment of McKay J upheld Thorp J's decision in the 
High Court, that the relationships between Exchange and the claimants was not fiduciary. 
McKay J rejected the proposition that Mr Liggett's "vulnerable" position gave rise to a 
fiduciary relationship. 106 
104 
105 
106 
No doubt he was "vulnerable" in the sense that he was dependent on the honesty of the 
Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership) (1994) 2 All ER 806. 
See above n 98. 
Above n 98, 290. 
18 
people with whom he was dealing, but that is true in any commercial transaction 
situation in which one person parts witl1 his money without immediate delivery of 
goods or their specific identification. 
McKay J was influenced by the essentially commercial character of the dealings, 101 pointing 
out that unless something further was established by way of a factual basis, the contract 
between Exchange and the claimants did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship. In the 
event, he did not find any factual basis for the imposition of fiduciary obligations. 108 
[Exchange] simply entered into contracts of sale. It advertised and promoted itself as 
a bullion trader and could, therefore, be assumed to be in business for its own benefit 
and to be acting in its own interests. Its business required it to enter into contractual 
relationships with members of the public wishing to purchase and store bullion, but this 
does not require or suggest a fiduciary relationship. 
In contrast, both Cooke P and Gault J found that a fiduciary relationship did exist between 
Exchange and the claimants. Cooke P, while acknowledging that "[t]he Courts should be 
slow to inject fiduciary duties into arms-length commercial transactions" 109 found that 
Exchange's practical independence from control or supervision by its clients, and the faith that 
clients were invited to place in Exchange, provided a classic paradigm of the assumption of 
a fiduciary status. 110 Likewise, Gault J was influenced by the strong suggestion in the 
evidence that the duties of a fiduciary were expected of the company by the purchasers and 
that expectation was encouraged. 111 
In the Privy Council very little attention was paid to the relative merits or otherwise of the 
majority's reasoning as to the fiduciary status of the relationship, although ultimately the 
Privy Council preferred Gault J' s approach. 112 The Privy Council's discussion on the nature 
107 Above n 98, 290 and 299. 
108 
Above n 98, 299. 
109 Above n 98, 267. 
110 Above n 98, 267. 
I II Above n 98, 282. 
112 Above n 104, 821 - 822. 
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of the relationship between the parties was primarily concerned with the implications that 
arise from an assumption of fiduciary status. As was pointed out, "[t]o describe someone as 
a fiduciary, without more, is meaningless". 113 Of greater importance was thought to be the 
answer to the question, if the company was a fiduciary of the claimants, "what kind of 
fiduciary duties did the company owe to the customer?" 114 Lord Mustill, speaking for the 
Board, proposed that Exchange's obligations under a fiduciary status would be to do honestly 
and conscientiously what it had by contract promised to do. 115 The reliance of the 
claimants on Exchange doing just this occurs in many commercial relationships, and is not 
justification for giving such relationships a fiduciary character. The tenor of the argument 
was succinctly summarised by Lord Mustill when he said "high expectations do not 
necessarily lead to equitable remedies" .116 
Yet it was equitable remedies that Cooke P and Gault J appeared to have in mind when 
pondering the plight of the claimants in the Goldcorp case. Gault J was willing to concede 
that in reaching his conclusions he had taken into account the company's conduct, which 
"must be seen overall as inequitable and unconscionable justifying relief". 117 Similar 
concerns are apparent in other Court of Appeal decisions, in particular with regard to the 
obligations that the Court of Appeal concludes are assumed under a fiduciary relationship. us 
It is the breadth of these obligations which has been queried in subsequent appeals to the 
Privy Council. 
2 Determining the nature of the duties that arise from fiduciary relationships 
Clark Boyce v Mouat is a recent decision of the Court of Appeal that was subsequently 
criticised by the Privy Council for unnecessarily expanding the purview of the fiduciary 
obligations in the circumstances of the case. Clark Boyce concerned an elderly, recently 
widowed woman, Mrs Mouat, whose son arranged for her to place a mortgage of $110 250 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
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on her home for his business interests. In return he undertook primary liability for interest 
payments. The son's usual solicitors declined to act for both the son and mother in the 
transaction, citing "ethical considerations". The son then requested the legal services of Mr 
Boyce, who was willing to act for the mother and son. An interview was carried out the next 
day, with Mr Boyce showing his awareness of the conflict between the mother and son's 
interests by suggesting three times that the mother obtain independent legal advice, and 
indicating that he could arrange for her to see another lawyer at a neighbouring law firm. 
Mrs Mouat was adamant that she wished to proceed with the transaction, so Mr Boyce drafted 
a form of authority and declinature of independent advice which she signed. Thereafter Mr 
Boyce pointed out to Mrs Mouat that if her son defaulted on mortgage payments she would 
lose her home. Mrs Mouat made it clear that she was already aware of this consequence. 
It subsequently happened that the son did default on payment, and Mrs Mouat's home was 
liable to be sold in a mortgagee sale. Mrs Mouat then brought an action against Mr Boyce's 
firm of solicitors, Clark Boyce, alleging, among other things, that Mr Boyce had breached his 
fiduciary obligations by ( 1) failing to decline to act for Mrs Mouat, (2) failing to disclose 
three respective types of relevant information, and (3) failing to adequately advise her of her 
need for independent advice. 
In the Court of Appeal, Gault J in the minority judgement agreed with the High Court 
decision of Holland J119 that the solicitor had not breached his fiduciary obligations. Gault 
J' s reasoning mirrors the Privy Council's, in that it is focused on the actual relationship 
between Mrs Mouat and Mr Boyce. Gault J observed that authorities on the subject of 
fiduciary obligations "emphasize that the nature and scope of fiduciary duties in a particular 
case will depend upon the specific relationship involved, and especially that which the 
fiduciary is called upon to do" .120 In contrast, McGechan J concentrated on the overall duty 
of good faith encapsulated in a fiduciary relationship. 121 He stated that a fiduciary may 
only act against the interests of a beneficiary if he or she obtains "fully informed consent", 
which requires that all of the material facts must be disclosed, explained and understood. 122 
119 
120 
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McGechan J's "objective" test for material facts - them being "fact[s] which relevantly and 
sensibly could be taken into account by a reasonable person" - led to an imposition of liability 
upon Mr Boyce for failing to create an informed consent, due to his failure to disclose 
relevant information. 123 On the other two counts of breach of fiduciary duty, McGechan 
J agreed with Sir Gordon Bisson that all three heads of liability had been established. 
In contrast, in the Privy Council Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, delivering the Board 's 
judgement, pointed out that. although informed consent is essential if a solicitor is to act for 
both parties in a transaction where their interests may conflict. the test for informed consent 
requires a determination of precisely what services are required of the solicitor by the 
parties. 124 That necessitated returning to the findings of the trial judge, Holland J, as to the 
intentions of Mrs Mouat. In fact, Holland J had been satisfied that Mrs Mouat was not 
concerned about the wisdom of the transaction, and was simply seeking a solicitor ' s services 
to ensure that the transaction was given proper effect by way of ascertaining questions of title 
and ensuring the parties achieve what they contracted for. 125 This finding had been adhered i , 
to by Gault J, while Sir Gordon Bisson and McGechan J had chosen to challenge it. 126 The 
Privy Council upheld Gault J and the trial judge's conclusions. It accepted that solicitor/client 
relationships are fiduciary in nature, and that a fiduciary duty in certain situations requires 
disclosure of material facts. Furthermore, the Privy Council agreed that this case was one in 
which certain material facts needed disclosure. However, it continued by pointing out that 
fiduciary duties cannot be prayed to enlarge the scope of contractual duties. There being no 
contractual duty on Mr Boyce to advise Mrs Mouat on the wisdom of entering into the 
transaction, she was not able to claim that he nevertheless owed her a fiduciary duty to give 
that advice. 127 It has been pointed out that the Privy Council's decision in Clark Boyce 
"may cause legal practitioners .. . to look more fondly upon Their Lordships ' guidance" .128 
123 
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3 Detennining the existence of constructive trusts 
In keeping with the tenor of this analysis thus far, the issue of constructive trusts concerns 
the conduct of parties, and their relationships with one another. 129 
Constructive trusts arise by operation of law. A constructive trust. in common with all 
other types of trusts, is a relationship in respect of property under which one person, 
known as a trustee, is obliged to deal with property vested in him for the benefit of 
another person, known as the beneficiary. But unlike all other trusts, a constructive 
trust is imposed by the court as a result of the conduct of the trustee and therefore 
arises independently of any of the parties. 
In New Zealand, "the constructive trust has become a broad equitable remedy for reversing 
that which is inequitable or unconscienable". 13° Constructive trusts are a creation of equity, 
and assume heightened significance given that they can be used to make persons who are 
neither trustees nor fiduciaries acknowledge another's right to property and account for it 
accordingly. Such was the usage of the constructive trust in the Court of Appeal's decision 
Elders Pastoral v Bank of New Zealand, 131 described by one commentator as "a new high-
water mark in the infiltration of equity into commercial law" .132 
In Elders Pastoral a farmer, Mr Gunn, was indebted to his stock agents, Elders, and to the 
Banlc of New Zealand (BNZ) as fourth mortgagee. In June 1987 Elders persuaded BNZ to 
take out a fust chattel security over the farmer's stock. Six months later Elders conducted 
a stock sale on behalf of the farmer, and from the proceeds of the sale Elders deducted not 
only their costs but also the amount of the farmer's current indebtedness to them. BNZ 
brought an action against Elders claiming the amount of the deduction for the farmer's debt 
to Elders. In the High Court, Master Hansen granted BNZ summary judgement against 
Elders. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Cooke P stated that, although Elders' good faith 
was not questioned, "on an objective test, theirs has to be seen as a less than conscienable 
129 
130 
131 
132 
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claim to retain money" .133 Using the elusive "reasonable person" test, Cooke P found a 
clear case for holding that a constructive trust was created under which Elders held the net 
proceeds of the sale for the Bank to the extent of the farmer 's indebtedness to the Ban.le. 
Somers J thought that Mr Gunn stood in fiduciary relationship to the Ban.le, due to the 
fiduciary nature of the implied contractual obligation that if Mr Gunn received monies 
payable on sale of assigned stock he would pay them to the Bank. 134 
Because the Privy Council judgment did not address the issue of constructive trusts, the Court 
of Appeal ' s reasoning on this point was not examined. However, a useful commentary by 
John Dixon raises a number of queries. 135 Firstly, Dixon points out that to describe the 
relationship between Elders and the Bank as "fiduciary" is to "put a great deal of strain on 
the word" .136 He proceeds to suggest that in fact no legal relationship existed between the 
parties - not in tort, contract, or a fiduciary relationship. In the light of this fact, Dixon states 
that the granting of a constructive trust and thereby proprietary remedy to the bank, "could 
be viewed as a little extreme, considering the effects of granting such a right (particularly in 
relation to third parties)". 137 Dixon concludes by pointing out that "[w]ithout too much ado, 
the Court of Appeal appears to have introduced a new emphasis on commercial morality". 138 
A similar rationale was adopted by the Court of Appeal in the Goldcorp case, with both 
Cooke P and Gault J holding that a constructive trust existed between Exchange and the 
claimants. Cooke P's analysis led to him labelling the situation as a "constructive trust on 
orthodox lines", 139 and Gault J said he would confer a proprietary interest on the purchasers 
by way of constructive trust over the bullion stocks held by the company at the date of 
receivership.140 In arriving at this conclusion, Gault J insisted on balancing the proprietary 
133 
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interest of the claimants against the competing claim of the secured creditor. As previously 
noted, Gault J had stated that the foundation of trust relief in Liggett v Kensington was the 
"inequitable and unconscionable" conduct overall of the company.141 This he balanced 
against his observation that generally the courts should be reluctant to grant an effective 
priority by means of constructive trust to a claimant party over a charge of a secured creditor 
which had been obtained for value and without notice of the circumstances giving rise to the 
claimant's claims. 142 In the circumstances of the case, Gault J suggested that BNZ as the 
debenture holder had indeed received notice of the type relevant for a knowing receipt 
constructive trust to be imposed on a stranger.143 It was therefore appropriate to grant some 
type of remedy to the claimants. 
McKay J was also aware that the imposition of a constructive trust in the circumstances of 
the case might be justified on remedial grounds. In dealing with the submission that a 
remedial trust ought to be imposed he discussed the Court of Appeal's decision in Elders 
Pastoral, in which this type of trust appeared to have first been recognized in New Zealand, 
and concluded:144 
This does not mean that a constructive trust is to be imposed on the basis of some 
vague idea of what might seem fair. It is used ... to prevent a person from retaining a 
benefit in breach of his legal or equitable obligations. The circumstances must be such 
that it would be unconscionable for the benefit to be retained by the person who 
received it.. [In Elders t]he constructive trust was not imposed by the Court as some 
new and unforeseeable hazard suddenly injected into a commercial relationship. It was 
simply giving effect to what reasonable people would have expected to be the position. 
McKay J then declined to impose such a trust. He also dismissed the contention that a 
"constructive trust in the ordinary sense" has arisen, 145 because no particular property had 
been vested in the trustee. 
141 
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McKay J 's reasons for declining to impose a more orthodox constructive trust accord with 
the underlying premise of the subsequent Privy Council judgment. As Lord Mustill made 
clear at the beginning of the Board's judgment, one crucial factor was going to stand in the 
way of the claimants at every point of the case. 146 That factor was that the contracts in 
question were for the sale of unascertained goods. Until the buyer knows to what goods the 
title relates, the buyer cannot acquire title. Lord Mustill quoted from Lord Blackburn's The 
Effect of the Contract of Sale 141 to succinctly convey the moot point in Liggett v 
Kensington, that the bullion purportedly sold under the contracts was never ascertained. 148 
The first of the rules that the parties must be agreed as to the specific goods on which 
the contract is to attach before there can be a bargain and sale, is one that is founded 
on the very nature of things... [l]t is clear there can be no intention to transfer the 
property in any particular lot of goods more than another, till it is ascertained which are 
the very goods sold. 
The quotation from Lord Blackburn's treatise continues; 
It makes no difference, although the goods are so far ascertained that the parties have 
agreed that they shall be taken from some specified larger stock. In such a case the 
reason still applies: the parties did not intend to transfer the property in one portion of 
the stock more than in another, and the law which only gives effect to their intention, 
does not transfer the property in any individual portion. 
Thus it was that, in the light of "the very nature of things", 149 there was simply no property 
in which the claimants could assert either a legal or equitable title. For instance, the Board 
pointed out that even if it had accepted that Exchange was a fiduciary, and that the claimants 
therefore would have achieved a proprietary interest if Exchange had done what is said, the 
fact remained that it did not do what it said. "There never was a separate and sufficient stock 
146 
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of bullion in which a proprietary interest could be created". 150 In so far as a remedial 
constructive trust over the company's bullion was concerned, the Privy Council found no 
justification for its creation. 151 
By leaving its stock of bullion in a non-differentiated state the company did not unjustly 
enrich itself by mixing its own bullion with that of the purchasers; for all the gold 
belonged to the company. It did not act wrongfully in acquiring, maintaining and using 
its own stock of bullion, since there was no term of the sale contracts or of the 
collateral promises, and none could possibly be implied, requiring that all the bullion 
purchased by the company should be set aside to fulfil the unallocated sales. The 
conduct of the company was wrongful in the sense of being a breach of contract, but 
it did not involve any injurious dealing with the subject matter of the alleged trust... The 
company's stock of bullion had no connection with the claimants' purchases, and to 
enable the claimants to reach out and not only abstract it from the assets available to 
the body of creditors as a whole, but also to afford a priority over a secured creditor, 
would give them an adventitious benefit devoid of the foundation in logic and justice 
which underlies this important new branch of the law. 
Similarly, the Privy Council was not persuaded that a remedial restitutionary right superior 
to the security created by the bank's charge should be subsequently created. Lord Mustill 
recognized that one possible avenue for realising such a right would be by striking "directly 
at the heart of the problem"152 and concluding that there was such an imbalance between 
the positions of the parties that if orthodox methods failed a new equity should intervene to 
put the matter right, without recourse to further rationalisation. Unsurp·risingly, this strategy 
was firmly rejected by Their Lordships, Lord Mustill saying "[t]he fact that the claimants are 
private citizens whereas their opponent is a commercial bank could not justify the court in 
simply disapplying the bank's valid security". 153 
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Negligence is another area of the law which has recently been at issue in New Zealand cases 
taken on appeal to the Privy Council. As Jack Hodder, an editor of The Capital Letter 
reported when the Privy Council's decision Deloitte Haskins & Sells v National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd154 was delivered, "the contemporary strike-rate is high for appellants to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from decisions of our Court of Appeal involving 
liability for negligence". 155 The reason for this high strike-rate is that the Court of Appeal 
has in recent years demonstrated that it is increasingly ready to accept negligence claims. The 
House of Lords commented on this tendency of our Court of Appeal in its 1994 judgment 
Spring v Guardian Assurance pie. 156 Lord Keith cited three New Zealand Court of Appeal 
cases involving negligence, 157 and then pointed out that they had been "decided in a 
jurisdiction which is well known to be tender in its approach to claims in negligence 
involving pure economic loss" .158 
Negligence is a tort caused by lack of proper care and attention or carelessness. It only arises 
if the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff to take care. It also requires that (a) the 
defendant acted in such a way as to breach the duty of care, (b) damage suffered by the 
plaintiff was caused by the defendant's breach of duty, and (c) the damage was also a 
sufficiently proximate consequence of that breach. 159 In New Zealand the Court of Appeal 
laid down guiding principles in Takaro Properties Ltd v Rowling. 160 Stephen Todd 
describes the law of negligence in New Zealand in the following way: 161 
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of previous authority. 
The fact that no single general principle is able to provide a practical test which can be 
applied to every single situation to determine whether a duty of care is owed, and if so, what 
is its scope, may account for the several occasions in which the Privy Council has disagreed 
with the Court of Appeal on issues of negligence. 
In 1993 the Privy Council delivered its judgment on Deloitte Haskin and Sells, an appeal 
from the New Zealand Court of Appeal concerning negligence and duties of care. The appeal 
was concerned with an action against Deloitte from breach of a common law duty of care in 
relation to the obligation to report in Section 50(2) of the Securities Act 1978. Deloitte had 
been liquidated in mid 1986, causing its trustee and guarantor, National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd (NMLN) to incur a liability of $6.75 million to AICS 's depositors. 
Proceedings were brought against, among others, Deloitte, in an effort by NMLN to recover 
the $6.75 million. 
Both the Privy Council and the Court of Appeal agreed with Henry J's conclusion in the High 
Court162 that a relationship of proximity existed between Deloitte and NMLN, giving rise 
to a duty of care on the part of Deloitte when making reports required under the Securities 
Act 1978 and the relevant trust deed. What was at issue in the Privy Council was how far 
any duties arising out of that relationship extended. In the Court of Appeal, 163 the High 
Court's far-ranging view of Deloitte's duties had been affirmed. Essentially it was found that 
Deloitte had breached its duty under Section 50(2) by not reporting on matters relevant to the 
exercise of the duties of the trustee. One of the trustee's duties under the trust deed had been 
to exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain whether or not any assets of AICS were sufficient 
or likely to be sufficient to discharge its liabilities. In the High Court, Holland J concluded 
that a prudent auditor would have formed an opinion and reported under Section 50(2) no 
later than mid March 1986. 164 Deloitte had therefore breached its common law duty of care 
to NMLN by failing to report AICS probable insolvency by mid March 1986. The Court of 
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Appeal, following slightly different interpretative reasoning, arrived at the same 
conclusion. 165 
The Privy Council, however, chose to differ. In considering whether in fact Deloitte had 
breached its common law duty of care owed to NMLN it adopted a rigorous analysis of the 
relevant legislation and documentation. It pointed out that, because the Section 50(2) duty 
is expressly only owed when an auditor had formed an opinion, the effect of the decisions 
in the Courts below was to impose upon auditors a common law duty more extensive than 
that imposed by the Act. 166 In the Court of Appeal, Casey J had been more persuaded by 
the evidence that serious financial problems existed by early March that were relevant to the 
exercise of the trustee's duties and powers than by the alternative submission "that it is 
incorrect to impose a duty in relation to matters in respect of which the auditor merely should 
have been aware - it can only be responsible for matters of which it was aware". 167 In 
contrast, the Privy Council's conclusion on the duty of care imposed under Section 50(2) is 
firmly within the constraints of the relevant legislation. Lord Jauncey for the Board pointed 
out that the duty to report under Section 50(2) is contingent upon the auditor having formed 
an opinion. The subjective nature of the test is evident in the inclusion of the words "in his 
opinion" into Section 50(2). Thus Their Lordships saw no justification for superimposing a 
common law duty of greater scope upon the statutory duty contained in the subsection. 
Similarly, m Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd the Privy 
Council168 was obliged to rein in a far-reaching duty of care suggested in the Court of 
Appeal judgment. 169 In this case, NMLN attempted to decrease its $6.75 million liability 
to AICS 's depositors by attaching contributory liability to the directors of AICS and to the 
Kuwait Asia Bank. Two of AICS's five directors were employed by the bank, which was 
beneficially interested in approximately 40 per cent of the shares in AICS. The case 
concerned whether or not NMLN could serve proceedings on the bank under Rule 131 of the 
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New Zealand High Court Rules, because the bank was in fact incorporated under the laws of 
Bahrain and operated internationally with no place of business in New Zealand. NMLN tried 
to get the proceedings brought within two of the Rule 219 exceptions, Rule 219(a) requiring 
that an act or omission for which the damages are claimed was done in New Zealand, and 
Rule 219(h) requiring that the person currently out of New Zealand is a proper party to the 
proceedings brought against some other person served within New Zealand. 
In the Court of Appeal Cook P opined that "[t]he ultimate issue under Rule 131 is whether 
the Court is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for it properly to assume 
jurisdiction" .170 He thought that this depended upon the strength of the plaintiff's case, and 
upon balancing all the circumstances of the case. It was enough for it to be shown that there 
was a "good arguable case" against the foreigner. Cooke P acknowledged that the case raised 
major and difficult questions of company law, in particular under Rule 219(a) questions 
relating to the duties of care owed by directors to third parties. He pointed out that although 
directors' primary duty of care was owed to the company, in this case AICS, in some 
circumstances directors could also come under a duty of care to persons dealing with the 
company, in this case NMLN. In the light of the terms of the trust deed between NMLN and 
AICS, Cooke P believed that it was arguable the directors owed a duty of care to NMLN. 
Cooke P also believed that it was arguable that the bank was liable as the principal of the 
directors, who were the bank's agents and purportedly acting in accordance with the bank's 
instructions. It was this latter duty of care that was queried in the Privy Council. Cooke P 
then proceeded to justify these findings by stating "[i]t is not a question about the lifting of 
the corporate veil. Rather it is a question about responsibility and no doubt in some cases 
about competing loyalties". 171 The Court of Appeal believed that the plaintiff had 
established a sufficiently strong case to warrant the New Zealand court accepting jurisdiction 
under Rule 131 of the High Court Rules. 
The Privy Council judgment in Kuwait Asia Bank, delivered for the Board by Lord Lowry, 
arrived at fundamentally different conclusions as to the proper interpretation of the relevant 
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High Court Rules, and as to the Court of Appeal's conclusion that NMLN, as plaintiff, had 
made out a case against the bank, as defendant outside New Zealand, which justified the 
Court in entertaining the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. Lord Lowry examined the 
approaches taken in the High Court and Court of Appeal as to the interpretation of the High 
Court Rules, pointing out that although they both arrived at the same conclusion, their 
reasoning was dissimilar. Because the Privy Council considered that no cause of action was 
made out by the plaintiff in the case, it acknowledged that it need not resolve the difference 
of opinion as to the right test between the Court of Appeal and Henry J in the High 
Court. 172 However, a preference for Henry J's reasoning could be read into Lord Lowry's 
comment that, "[a]s was said recently in Equiticorp Finance Group Ltd v Cheah Their 
Lordships would be most reluctant to differ from the Court of Appeal on a matter of 
procedure under the New Zealand rules". 173 It is also noticeable that the Privy Council's 
support for an examination of the merits of the case adheres more to Henry J' s conclusion, 
that the issue of jurisdiction to hear and determine the case is a fact related to whether the 
proceeding should be struck out because no cause of action is disclosed, than it does to Cooke 
P's "good arguable case" analysis. In any event, the Privy Council did not find any cause of 
action established against the bank. This was because the bank had never accepted or 
assumed any duty of care towards NMLN, and therefore, in the absence of fraud or bad faith 
on the part of the bank, no liability attached to the bank in favour of NMLN for any 
instructions or advice given by the bank to the two directors. 174 
By the terms of the trust deed or by agreement supplemental to the trust deed NMLN 
might have attempted to impose a duty of care on third parties such as the bank, but 
NMLN neither intended nor attempted expressly or by implication to impose on 
employers, shareholders or any other third parties liability for acts or omissions of the 
only persons [the directors] who by the trust deed were charged with the duty to see 
that the quarterly certificates were accurate. 
The Privy Council's evident preference for a narrower duty of care than the New Zealand 
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Court of Appeal, as seen in the Deloitte Haskin & Sells and Kuwait Asia Bank appeals, can 
be inferred from a comment of Lord Oliver of Aylmorton in the Privy Council's judgment 
Meates v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd. In this case both the Court of Appeal175 and 
the Privy Council176 dismissed the appellant's claims to indemnity and contributions which 
had been argued for, inter alia, under a duty of care. In Meates the Privy Council queried the 
reasoning that had led the Court of Appeal to reach the conclusion that a duty of care existed 
in an earlier case, Meates v Attorney General. 177 In particular, the Privy Council referred 
to a passage in Cooke J's (as he was then) judgment. However, the Privy Council felt 
obliged to assume that Meates had been correctly decided and should be followed. Lord 
Oliver concluded the Board's judgment with the following statement:178 
The claims which have been pursued [in this expensive and protracted litigation] have 
rested upoit ignoring the express terms of the formal docwnents which have been 
executed and seeking to supplement and contradict them by reference to contracts and 
duties of care alleged to have arisen by implication from conversations, press statements 
and other unsuspected traps into which the parties are alleged to have fallen. To say 
that, as a general rule, governments and large corporations intend to be bound only by 
formal written engagements assumed after mature consideration, reflection and 
negotiation may seem something of a truism; but in the light of the history of this 
litigation, it may not be inappropriate to reiterate it and to stress that anyone impatient 
of official delays, whether avoidable or unavoidable, who anticipates the conclusion of 
negotiations does so at his own risk. 
5 Reasoning of the Court of Appeal queried by the Privy Council - Precedent, Causation 
and Interpretation 
Precedent 
In arriving at a decision that granted the claimants a proprietary remedy, the Court of Appeal 
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in the Goldcorp case dispensed with a number of additional legal points that prevented the 
successful disposition of the claimants ' case. One significant point that stood in the 
claimants' way was the argument that the bank ' s debenture had priority over any unsecured 
proprietal interest of the claimants. Cooke P dealt with this by citing a decision of the Privy 
Council that he had had the honour of participating in, namely Space Investments Ltd 11 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co (Bahamas) Ltd. 119 Cooke P drew from the 
case a governing distinction between trust beneficiaries not taking a risk of insolvency and 
lenders taking that risk. He concluded: 180 
What is tolerably clear, in my view, is that the bank on electing to take over the 
Goldcorp account was in a better position to ascertain particulars of Exchange ' s trading 
methods, and to assess the risks, than were the nonallocated purchasers. It is not 
inequitable that the latter should have priority over the bank. 
The Privy Council, on the other hand, found it "difficult to understand" 181 how Space 
Investments could even be applied on the facts, given that it concerned monies being paid into 
a mixed fund, whereas here the monies said to be impressed with a trust were paid into an 
overdrawn, and in effect nonexistent, fund. The Privy Council was equally dismissive of 
Cooke P's reliance on Goulding J in Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank 
(London) Ltd182 believing that the situations in the two cases were entirely different. Cooke 
P had cited Chase Manhattan as authority for the proposition that the claimants ' payment of 
money, made as it were by mistake, resulted in retained proprietary interest giving rise to a 
constructive trust. Furthermore, the Privy Council did not accept the claimants ' argument that 
they need not assert the same proprietary interest against a bank as they would do if their 
opponent was a stranger to the entire relationship. 183 Instead, Lord Mustill suggested that 
the chargee, the bank, does not become on crystallisation of the charge the universal successor 
of the charger, Exchange. Rather, the bank becomes entitled to a proprietary interest which 
it may assert adversely against Exchange. The freedom of Exchange to deal with its assets 
179 
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pending the crystallisation of the charge did not entail that the bank's right to assets be 
circumscribed by an indebtedness of a purely personal nature. 184 
Standing in stark contrast to the Court of Appeal's innovative use of precedents in the 
Goldcorp case, in Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid the Court of Appeal adhered rigidly 
to an old and criticised English Court of Appeal precedent that had the effect of constraining 
the accountability of a fiduciary. When the case was appealed to the Privy Council, Lord 
Templeman in delivering the judgment of the Board queried the Court of Appeal's affirmation 
of the precedent Lister & Co v Stubbs, 185 stating that "the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
must be free to review an English Court of Appeal authority on its merits and to depart from 
it if the authority is considered wrong". 186 And that is precisely what the Privy Council did. 
It held that as soon as Mr Reid, who was a fiduciary of his employer, the Hong Kong 
government, received a bribe in breach of his duty he was obliged to pay and account for the 
bribe to the government. 187 Lord Templeman dismissed Lister & Co v Stubbs as 
inconsistent with the principles guiding fiduciary relationships, 188 preferring instead to 
impose liability in the light of attitudes such as those expressed in Boardman v Phipps: 189 
Boardman v Phipps demonstrates the strictness with which equity regards the conduct 
of a fiduciary and the extent to which equity is willing to impose a constructive trust 
on property obtained by a fiduciary by virtue of his office. 
Causation 
Decisions reached by the Court of Appeal on causation have also been queried in subsequent 
Privy Council judgments. In Deloitte Haskin & Sells the Privy Council was again critical of 
reasoning utilized by the Court of Appeal that on the face of it could be viewed as a means 
of ensuring that the desired end result would be arrived at. Having decided that a broader 
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common law duty of care than that imposed under the Securities Act was appropriate, the 
Court of Appeal then established that the purported breach of that duty by Deloitte had been 
causative of NMLN' s loss. This it did by agreeing with Henry J in the High Court, that the 
issue was whether NMLN's own breaches of duty to particular depositors and its liability to 
them would have been avoided in whole or in part had Deloitte or the directors complied with 
their duties of care . 190 McGechan J went into a detailed analysis of causation in the case. 
He was uneasy with the proposition that it was possible that nothing Deloitte did after March 
1986 would have been "causative" of NMLN's liability, preferring instead to accept that if 
Deloitte had given a timely Section 50(2) report identifying AICS's probable insolvency 
NMLN would eventually have acted to freeze the situation, preventing it worsening. 191 
McGechan J acknowledged that policy considerations underlie causation questions, and 
thought that in the present case policy should be allowed to operate so that all of those 
responsible for the circumstances giving rise to the harm which the plaintiff actually suffered, 
including the plaintiff itself where appropriate through contributory negligence, should be 
brought into the proceedings, and responsibility apportioned accordingly. 192 
In the Privy Council it was held that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to endorse the 
approach to causation taken in the High Court. 193 
The question to be answered is not whether NMLN would, on receipt of an earlier 
report, have avoided liability to those depositors existing at 30 August 1986 [date of 
liquidation] but whether, by Deloitte's failure to report, NMLN suffered a loss which 
it would not have suffered if Deloitte had reported by mid March 1986. 
Because the evidence inferred that, even if AICS had been closed at the end of March 1986, 
it would still have been liable for $6.75 million to depositors, the Privy Council held that 
causation had not been established. 
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Clark Boyce v Mouat is another example of a Court of Appeal decision where reasoning on 
causation is subsequently challenged by the Privy Council. Bisson J surmised that the 
solicitor's negligence had caused Mrs Mouat's loss. 194 He postulated that if Mrs Mouat had 
been fully and properly advised by an independent solicitor, or even by Mr Boyce, she would 
not have signed the mortgage as the real risk to her home would have emerged. Bisson J 
then proceeded to point out that even if the disclosure and advice which she would have been 
given would not have altered her mind, equity would give relief regardless. 195 In contrast, 
the Privy Council believed that even if the solicitor had informed Mrs Mouat of certain 
matters that had not been disclosed to her, and if nondisclosure had amounted to a breach of 
contract, there was evidence neither that Mrs Mouat would have accepted the advice nor that 
if she had she would have acted differently. Mrs Mouat had therefore failed to establish she 
suffered loss as a result of any such breach. 196 It is pertinent to this conclusion that the 
Privy Council drew heavily upon the findings of the trial judge as to the witness's state of 
mind, while in the Court of Appeal McGechan J and Bisson J chose to differ from Holland 
J's evidentiary findings, for no substantive reason. Lord Jauncey appeared unimpressed with 
their contrary conclusions, citing Viscount Haldane LC in Nocton v Lord Ashburton: 197 
[l]t is only in exceptional circumstances that judges of appeal, who have not seen the 
witness in the box, ought to differ from the finding of fact of the judge who tried the 
case as to the state of mind of the witness. 
He proceeded to point out that no such exceptional circumstance existed in this case which 
would justify differing from Holland J's evidentiary findings. 
Interpretation 
The Court of Appeal 's interpretative reasoning in Elders Pastoral v BNZ came under scrutiny 
in the subsequent Privy Council judgment. The debate concerned the interpretation of 
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legislation and a stock security. While the Court of Appeal judgment is primarily concerned 
with the conscienability of Elders retaining the proceeds of the sale, and the imposition of a 
constructive trust, the Privy Council judgment does not address either of these issues. Lord 
Templeman on behalf of Their Lordships undertook a detailed analysis of the relevant 
documents and legislation. He concluded that clause 15 of the stock security did create an 
equitable assignment by way of charge on any future chose in action, namely the right of a 
grantor to receive and recover from a purchaser the sale price of stock mortgaged to the 
bank.198 In the Court of Appeal Cooke P had disposed of this possibility by simply saying 
he did not think that clause 15 went as far as to amount to a contract by the farmer to assign 
a future chose in action. 199 Similarly, Somers J opined that the provisions of clause 15 were 
not sufficiently clear to amount to a contract to assign future property.200 Both Cooke P 
and Somers J substantiated this point by referring to clause 19 of the stock security, a 
reference that the Privy Council was unpersuaded had any effect whatsoever on the 
construction of clause 15. Somers J alluded to the fact that, if clause 15 had been intended 
to create an assignment Mr Gunn would surely have been obliged to give notice to purchasers 
of the bank's right.201 However, the Privy Council pointed out that the stock security was 
a registrable instrument under Section Two of the Chattels Transfer Act 1924, and that Elders 
had notice of that charge as a result of registration of the stock security under Section 4(1). 
Thus, Their Lordships having decided that clause 15 of the stock security did create a charge, 
were not required to consider whether the Court of Appeal judgment should be affirmed on 
other grounds. Employing a more orthodox line of reasoning they had arrived at the same 
result. 
6 Conclusion 
These six cases together indicate that the approaches taken by our Court of Appeal and by 
the Privy Council towards issues of equity and negligence are increasingly inconsistent. This 
need not, of itself, be cause for alarm. A final appellate court exists in order to scrutinize, 
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and if necessary, re-assess decisions of lower courts. By querying the Court of Appeal's 
imposition of a constructive trust in the Goldcorp case, and by narrowing the duty of care 
imposed by the Court of Appeal in Clark Boyce v Mouat, the Privy Council was simply 
fulfilling its role as final appellate court. Similarly, by pointing out in Elders Pastoral v BNZ 
that the same decision could have been arrived at with more orthodox legal reasoning, the 
Privy Council was fulfilling this role. And so on for the other Court of Appeal judgments 
that have been queried in subsequent Privy Council appeals. 
Consternation need only arise when it is suggested that the New Zealand justice system as 
it is currently conceived would operate effectively without the Privy Council. Clearly, this 
is not the case. On the contrary, the Privy Council is currently demonstrating how vital it is 
to the overall concept of "justice" in New Zealand. If the New Zealand justice system was 
to ever operate effectively without the Privy Council, it would need to have in place an 
alternative forum that is equally capable of acting as a final arbiter of legal issues. 
IV ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL 
There seems to be a consensus that if the right of appeal to the Privy Council were to be 
abolished, a third appellate tier will need to be created. The "White Paper", in reviewing the 
court system required for a Bill of Rights Act, conditioned abolition of the Privy Council 
appeal on the creation of an alternative appeal forum. 202 The Royal Commission on Courts 
made the point strongly203 that "there can be little doubt that issues do benefit from the 
distillation or crystallisation of argument provided by a second tier of appeal" .204 The Law 
Commission clarified this by indicating that a second appeal is not intended to necessarily 
benefit the litigants, but is "for the purpose of expounding and stabilizing principles of law" 
for the public's benefit.205 This view is perhaps a little too simplistic, in so far as it ignores 
the desire of litigants to explore every avenue before admitting defeat. It also fails to bring 
attention to the fact that, before considering the options for a third appellate tier, an important 
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issue that must first be resolved is "whether the distinctive New Zealand legal identity should 
be one which gives judges, as opposed to the legislature, the power to make policy decisions 
or 'value judgments ' with potentially far-reaching effects".206 It could be argued that a 
geographically and philosophically distanced appeal court may instil greater certainty and 
impartiality into significant policy issues. 
However, if we are to proceed from the assumption that in time appeals to the Privy Council 
will be abolished,207 what are our alternatives? 
A An Australasian or Pacific Appeal Court 
A logical solution to the creation of a third appellate court would be to combine the judicial 
expertise and resources of neighbouring countries. For instance, Bernard Clark recommends 
an Australasian appeal court.208 
There is no necessity for the Privy Council to sit in London or be exclusively or mainly 
comprised of English judges. A New Zealand Privy Council could sit in Wellington 
or even Canberra and comprise New Zealand judges together with select Australian 
judges from the Commonwealth High Court and, if they were prepared to come, a few 
of the very best judges from the United Kingdom. 
Although in so far as Australia is concerned it could be submitted that the logistical problems 
of travel and cultural diversity are lessened,209 this is not so in respect to Asia, the South 
Pacific or countries further afield. A Pacific appeal court may also be susceptible to 
domination by the larger and more powerful country, Australia. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that an Australasian or Pacific appeal court would again require an "unpalatable" 
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surrender of New Zealand's sovereignty.210 Eichelbaum CJ has pointed out that it is 
illogical to suggest a third tier comprising or including judges of other countries "if we are 
abolishing the Privy Council appeal on account of the affront to our sovereignty or because 
foreign judges do not have sufficient knowledge of New Zealand conditions".211 
However, the repatriation of the Privy Council to New Zealand could be a thoroughly 
independent and nation-affirming move. Rather than shunning exposure to foreign 
jurisdictions, it would welcome such exposure, and in doing so would reveal a country that 
is proud of and comfortable with its legal identity and institutions. The Council could be 
situated in Wellington, with the best judges from our own and neighbouring jurisdictions 
regularly sitting. Judges from jurisdictions further afield may be occasionally invited to sit 
also. Such a Council would inevitably strengthen feelings of nationalism and pride. It would 
establish New Zealand as an internationally-renowned centre of dispute resolution, where 
judges and counsel of the highest calibre resolve legal issues of great public and social 
importance. A repatriated Privy Council would stimulate, rather than undermine, New 
Zealand's sovereignty and indigenous legal identity. 
B Transforming the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
Another solution may be for our Court of Appeal to adapt in order to address the needs 
currently being met by the Privy Council. Strategies for doing so tend to suggest increasing 
the number of permanent judges on the court, so that when the occasion requires two 
divisions can sit concurrently, or on cases of exceptional public importance the whole court 
would sit. Joseph believes that "[t]wo divisions of the Court would enhance judicial 
specialise within it, relieve pressure of workload and release more time for consideration of 
important or complex legal points".212 
This idea is evident in a recent discussion paper published by the New Zealand Law Society's 
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Civil Litigation and Tribunals Committee.213 The Committee's model has been developed 
in response to recent trends in the New Zealand justice system, whereby the District Court 
has assumed greater original jurisdiction, the High Court has assumed a greater appellate role, 
and the Court of Appeal has evinced a need "for fewer cases and more time to reflect" .214 
The model essentially divides the High Court into a general appellate division and a second 
civil and criminal appellate division. This leaves the Court of Appeal free to assume a role 
similar to that currently met by the Privy Council. In particular, the Committee recommends 
that appeals from an appellate division of the High Court to the Court of Appeal as final court 
require special leave.215 
C Special Leave 
A primary concern with the current right of appeal to the Privy Council is the ease with 
which an appeal can be taken to England. This is due to Rule 2(a) of the 1910 Order which 
says an appeal shall lie as of right where the value in dispute is NZ$5000 or more. Given 
that few appeals to the Privy Council involve less than this sum, this provision is too 
generous for appeal as of right.216 A solution may be to put in place a "special leave" 
requirement, as currently operates in Australia for appeals to the High Court.217 For cases 
to be granted the right to appeal to the Australian High Court, applicants must first identify 
the issue which is said to merit the grant of special leave. They must them demonstrate that 
this issue is of sufficient importance, and that the substance of the proposed appeal is 
sufficiently arguable.218 D F Jackson points out that "important" is an ephemeral notion, 
and that the mere fact a large sum of money is involved does not mean the issue is 
important.219 He also says that the prospects of obtaining special leave in Australia are 
greater if judgments in the courts below are not unanimous.220 
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By requiring special leave to be obtained before cases can be taken to the Privy Council, the 
Council will only sit in judgment on legal issues that (1) are of fundamental importance to 
the development of the law, or (2) have been misconstrued or misdirected in lower courts, and 
are in need of clarifying or correcting. That is precisely what is required of New Zealand's 
final appellate court. Jackson describes the effect of the requirement for special leave in 
Australia in the following way: 221 
[T]he determination of which cases the court will, or will not, entertain plays a vital 
part in identifying the areas of the law in which change may occur, and the pace of any 
such change. 
D Retaining our Current Court System 
Another strategy for responding to the abolition of Privy Council appeals may be to retain 
our current court system just as it is. Eichelbaum CJ suggests this when he points out that 
if we were to comprise a third appellate court from the Court of Appeal our best judges 
would be relegated to a forum with a light work load, thereby weakening the Court of 
Appeal.222 
And all this apparently for the sake of providing a third tier when, at the moment, we 're 
functioning quite comfortably without any real third tier at all given the extremely 
limited number of cases that actually go to the Privy Council. 
This option is also plausible because it counters the issue of cost which would arise if we 
were to create a new appellate court. It is unlikely that the resources exist within New 
Zealand to create a further appellate layer,223 and even if they did, it is arguable that "the 
resources would be better focused on improving the bottom end of the system which is where, 
in terms of the person in the street, access to justice really counts".224 Furthermore, by 
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retaining the right of appeal to the Privy Council, those few cases that require consideration 
beyond the Court of Appeal will still have a further forum in which to plead their case. 
V CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Privy Council debate covers a vast range of concerns and issues. It 
encompasses criticism that the spectre of the Privy Council constrains the development of an 
indigenous legal culture, that it is inaccessible to all but a select few of the community, and 
that it threatens the autonomy and identity of New Zealand. In contrast, the debate 
acknowledges that the Privy Council fulfils a needed role in the New Zealand justice system 
of a final appellate court, and that this role is carried out in a manner that is cost efficient to 
the New Zealand public and that provides access to the top legal talent that England has to 
offer. Furthermore, the Privy Council acts as a safety-monitor for those rare occasions when 
the Court of Appeal, for whatever reason, is mistaken or simply gets it wrong. 
The six Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgments examined in this paper tend to suggest 
that the Privy Council has a critical and substantive role to play in the New Zealand justice 
system. As with all final appellate courts, the Privy Council in these six cases was able to 
elucidate and clarify the law.225 In Liggett v Kensington this involved the Privy Council 
querying the Court of Appeal's decision that a fiduciary relationship existed between 
Exchange and the claimants, and instead establishing that Exchange owed no fiduciary duties 
to the claimants. Similarly, in Deloitte Haskin & Sells the Privy Council queried the Court 
of Appeal's decision that Deloitte owed NMLN a duty of care, and instead established that 
the only duty of care owed by Deloitte was under Section 50(2) of the Securities Act 1978, 
which Deloitte had not breached. Clark Boyce v Mouat saw the Privy Council narrowing a 
broad solicitor/client duty of care imposed by the Court of Appeal, and Kuwait Asia Bank 
again saw the Privy Council reining in a far-reaching duty of care suggested in the Court of 
Appeal judgment. In Elders Pastoral, although not required to decide upon the constructive 
trust imposed by the Court of Appeal, the Privy Council revealed that the correct final result 
could have been arrived at by using more orthodox interpretative reasoning. Constructive 
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trusts were also at issue in the Goldcorp appeal, and again underlying the Privy Council's 
judgment was the suggestion that the Court of Appeal had been too hasty in its utilization of 
equitable remedies. Causation principles enunciated in the Court of Appeal have also come 
within the purview of these six Privy Council judgments, in particular in the cases of Deloitte 
Haskin & Sells and Clark Boyce. Finally, the Court of Appeal's reliance on precedents has 
been the subject of scrutiny by the Privy Council. 
When added together, it is apparent that in these six cases, the Privy Council has found that 
a number of points made by the Court of Appeal are either problematic or questionable. 
Some commentators may contend that by acknowledging these difficulties, and undertaking 
to address them, the Privy Council is effectively undermining the competence and integrity 
of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. I, however, would contend that, on the contrary, the 
Privy Council is fulfilling the role that any final appellate court is required to do. In doing 
so it is examining issues raised by the Court of Appeal that need examining, and is 
elucidating or reassessing these issues where appropriate. This is a crucial role, and the New 
Zealand justice system would be inadequate without it. Even if all other reasons for retaining 
the right of appeal to the Privy Council were obsolete, the need for the Privy Council or for 
another similar final appellate court to keep acting as the final arbiter of New Zealand cases 
remains paramount. 
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APPENDIX I 
New Zealand Appeals to the Privy Council since 1983 
PC Number Parties Date of Decision Result 
38/83 R v Kaitamaki 1/5/84 Refused 
56/84 Hart v O'Connor 22/5/85 Allowed 
22/86 CIR v Challenge 20/10/86 Allowed 
40/86 Taylor v Rotowax 30/3/87 Refused 
14/87 Chch Drainage v Brown 14/9/87 Refused 
8/88 NZ Meat Industry 4/5/88 Refused 
46/88 Vugnovich 23/5/89 Refused 
42/88 Savill v Chase 31/10/88 Refused 
27/88 Chase v GSH 31/10/88 Allowed 
43/88 Barber v Barber 4/5/89 Refused 
6/89 Swee v Equiticorp 12n/89 Refused 
18/89 Green v BCNZ 18n/89 Refused 
13/89 Money v Playle 21n189 Refused 
40/89 Kuwait Asia Bank 21/5/90 Allowed 
43/89 Meates v Westpac 5/6/90 Refused 
51/89 Elders v BNZ (I) 18/6/90 Refused 
24/89 Stewart v Welch 2n190 Refused 
39/89 CIR v Databank 23n;90 Refused 
17/88 Holt v Holt 23n;90 Refused 
19/90 Republic Resources v NZ/ 25n;90 Refused 
51/89 Elders v BNZ (2) 22/10/90 Refused 
15/90 Applefields 3/12/90 Allowed 
41/90 DFC v Coffey 18/3/91 Allowed 
46/90 Butcher v Petrocorp 18/3/91 Allowed 
32/90 Lloyds Bank v CIR 19/6/91 Allowed 
7/91 NZ Stock Exchange v CIR 1n;91 Refused 
14/91 Swee v Equiticorp 13/11/91 Refused 
26/91 EQC v Waitaki 25/11/91 Allowed 
13/91 Downsview v First CIRY 19/11/92 Refused, cross 
appeal allowed 
14/92 Hadlee v CIR 1/3/93 Refused 
28/92 Deloittes v NML 10/6/93 Allowed 
49/93 Clark Boyce v Mouat 4/10/93 Allowed 
44/93 AG Hong Kong v Reid 1/11/93 Allowed 
14/93 NZ Maori Council v AG 13/12/93 Refused 
21/94 Telecom v Clear 19/10/94 Refused 
36/94 Adams v R 31/10/94 Refused 
30/94 MVDI v UDC Finance 16/11/94 Allowed 
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